


HKEx Hosting Services Ecosystem Forum

Market Integrity

Bryan Chan Co-Head of EFIC, Global Markets 20 March 2014





Is This the Right Time to Reopen Market Structure **Reform Discussion?**







	2000-10	2010-11	2012-14
Events	 Prevalence of electronic trading Emergence of HFTs, hedge funds, and prime brokerage 	6 May 2010 "Flash Crash"	 Knight Capital Facebook IPO China Everbright Incident 4 NASDAQ outages Hanmag options incident (KRX) ASX system glitch
Regulatory Mindset	 Encourage technology innovation for productivity enhancement Emergence of ATS, ECN and alternative trading venues Best price execution for investors 	 Push for greater trade data transparency Re-assess benefits of market fragmentation Scrutiny of short selling 	 Greater scrutiny of risk management facilities of algos/electronic trading Robustness of dependencies between inter-linked markets
Consequences	 Growth of electronic trading and faster speed of trading Proliferation of HFTs: 61% of US stock market volume in 2009 Market fragmentation Establishment of DMA 	 Greater adoption of circuit breakers Review of error trade cancellation rules Tightening of short-selling 	 Mandating PTRM of market participants Algo testing / "Know your algo" requirements SFC's new regulation on electronic trading


From de-regulation to re-regulation

Market Integrity – Why Do We Need It?



Closing Auction Session (CAS)	 High institutional demand Adopted by almost all major securities markets For cash market only Consultation expected in 2014
Circuit Breakers	 Protection of the market from disorderly volatility while not preventing normal price discovery For both cash and derivatives markets Consultation expected in 2014
Pre-Trade Risk Management (PTRM)	 Measures preventing submission of orders that could adversely affect market integrity Increasing focus from regulators and participants Project commencing late 2014; launch TBD

Plan the <u>RIGHT</u> Reforms at the <u>RIGHT</u> Time



Why does the Market Need a Closing Auction Session?



HKEx Current Closing Mechanism	Median of 5 snapshots prices in the last minute of trading
Importance of Closing Mechanism	 Determines closing price, which is used for portfolio valuations & benchmarking (e.g. index tracking funds) Significant equity flow requires execution at closing price ~11% equity flow (incl. daily market on close and rebalancing orders)
Issues with Current Mechanism	 Closing price determined by a single price → Volume and supply/demand not considered EPs cannot execute Market on Close (MOC) orders at closing price due to current calculation methodology → tension between EPs and their clients Tracking error for index funds → Hamper return for investors

Benefits of CAS



Brokers and Investors

- Allow execution at closing price
- Reduce tracking error
- Lower transaction cost
- Lower infrastructure cost and capacity requirements for brokers

<u>Market</u>

- Improve liquidity and lower market volatility at close
- Improve price discovery for less liquid stocks
- Enhance competitiveness
- Strengthen index product development


Closing Mechanism in International Markets



Region	Markets with CAS		Markets with Other Closing Mechanism	
North America	USCanada		-	
Europe & Middle East	 Austria Belgium Denmark Finland France Germany Ireland Israel 	 Italy Netherlands Norway Portugal Spain Sweden Switzerland UK 	_	
Asia-Pacific	AustraliaJapanNew ZealandKorea	SingaporeTaiwanMainland (SZSE)	 India (30-min VWAP) Mainland (SSE) (1-min VWAP) Hong Kong (medium of 5-snapshots nominal) 	

All 23 MSCI developed markets except Hong Kong have a closing auction

Note: Mainland, India, Korea and Taiwan are not classified as developed markets by MSCI



Overview of Circuit Breakers



Background

- Circuit breakers (CB) is an automated price volatility safeguard mechanism which offers a cool-off period during abrupt price volatility affecting market integrity
- Our market has discussed CBs from time to time before, with the conclusion being that they were not necessary and may cause unnecessary market interruption
- However, we have recently reconsidered CBs and formed a working group to conduct internal study and prepare market consultations

Why Now?

- Proliferation of electronic trading including internet trading, algorithmic trading and direct market access that has increased the risk of disorderly trading
- Trading incidents caused by erroneous orders creating over-reaction and hampered market integrity in overseas markets (e.g. 2010 Flash Crash)
- Global trend various industry bodies (e.g. IOSCO) and overseas regulators/exchanges (e.g. SEC, ASIC, SGX) have called for and introduced circuit breakers in recent years


Benefits of Circuit Breakers

- Safeguard against disorderly trading (e.g. from technical glitches and erroneous trades)
- Give investors time to assimilate incoming information and make informed choices during periods of high market volatility
- Reduce reputational, operational, and financial risks to the Exchange, Exchange Participants and investors from unintended market volatility




		Cash Market			Derivatives Market		
Region	Exchange	Market Level CB	Instrument Level CB	Exchange	Market Level CB	Instrument Level CB	
US	NYSE / NASDAQ	✓ (daily downside limit)	✓ (dynamic price bands)	СМЕ	×	✓ (daily price limits & dynamic price bands)	
Europe	LSE / DB	×	✓ (dynamic price bands)	Eurex	×	✓ (dynamic price bands)	
	SGX	×	✓ (dynamic price bands)	SGX	×	✓ (daily price limits)	
Asia	TSE	×	✓ (daily price limits & dynamic price bands)	OSE / TSE ¹	×	✓ (daily price limits & dynamic price bands)	
	KRX	✓ (daily downside limit)	✓ (daily price limits)	KRX	×	✓ (dynamic price bands)	
	SSE / SZSE	×	✓ (daily price limits)	тосом	×	✓ (daily price limits)	

Note 1: The derivatives markets of OSE and TSE will be integrated into a single market effective March 24, 2014




The model chosen should suit Hong Kong market's specific circumstances





Following SFC regulation (paragraph 18.3 of the Code of Conduct) and IOSCO Principle 3 on DEA, the intermediary retains ultimate responsibility for all orders under its authority



Risk management involves several independent line of defenses and responsibilities




How Can An Exchange Facilitate Better Risk Management




Examples				
Clients	Information to Members	Participants need information from the exchange or clearing house to perform their own risk management	Drop copyPosition dataRisk data	
NCMs / EPs	Member	Controls support action (either for the	 Alerts Limits Stop / kill Cancel on Disconnect 	
GCPs	Control services	participant themself or for their clients) when risk reaches threatening levels		
Market	Market Integrity Controls	Controls support the "last line of defense" to maintain market integrity	 Fat finger checks Duplicate orders Price bands Circuit breaker 	
Clearing House	Clearing House Risk Management	Measures to manage counterparty credit risk	• Margin	
Limitations for an exchange				

Limited granularity - An exchange doesn't know the end client

Exchange provided PTRM can complement but not replace intermediary systems





We will listen to your feedback and work with you to make Hong Kong a safer and better place to trade!





Questions and Answers