#### **Submitted via Qualtrics**

**Prosperity REIT** 

Company/Organisation view

**Listed Company** 

#### **Question 1**

Do you agree with our proposal to introduce a new Code Provision (CP) under the Corporate Governance Code (CG Code) requiring issuers without an independent board chair to designate one independent non-executive director (INED) as a Lead INED to enhance engagement with investors and shareholders?

No

#### Please provide reasons for your views.

The proposal on the Lead INED designation would inevitably create a ranking structure amongst the INEDs, which defeats the original intention of advocating equality and also liability of directors.

The primary responsibility of the Lead INED under the proposal is to facilitate and strengthen communication: among INEDs; between INEDs and the rest of the board; and with shareholders. However, in Hong Kong, this role is typically handled by the Investor Relations Department. This arrangement has long been in place effectively with no evidence of the Investor Relations Department in listed issuers fail to perform the communication function. In the case of Prosperity REIT, the Investment & Investor Relations Department will organize these kinds of meetings regularly. Besides, as the guidance on the Lead INED's role and functions is yet ready, and also all of the INEDs are not responsible for day-to-day management of the company, a Lead INED may find it difficult to cope with the heightened obligations of the designation.

### Question 2(a)

Regarding continuous professional development for directors, do you agree with our proposal to make continuous professional development mandatory for all existing directors, without specifying a minimum number of training hours?

Please provide reasons for your views.

## Question 2(b)

Regarding continuous professional development for directors, do you agree with our proposal to require First-time Directors to complete a minimum of 24 hours of training within 18 months following their appointment?

Please provide reasons for your views.

## Question 2(c)

Regarding continuous professional development for directors, do you agree with our proposal to define "First-time Directors" to mean directors who (i) are appointed as a director of an issuer listed on the Exchange for the first time; or (ii) have not served as a director of an issuer listed on the Exchange for a period of three years or more prior to their appointment?

Please provide reasons for your views.

# Question 2(d)

Regarding continuous professional development for directors, do you agree with our proposal to specify the specific topics that must be covered under the continuous professional development requirement?

Please provide reasons for your views.

#### **Question 3**

Do you agree with the proposed consequential changes to Principle C.1 and CP C.1.1 of the CG Code?

Please provide reasons for your views.

### **Question 4**

Do you agree with our proposal to upgrade the current Recommended Best Practice (RBP) in the CG Code to a CP requiring issuers to

conduct regular board performance reviews at least every two years and make disclosure as set out in CP B.1.4?

Please provide reasons for your views.

#### **Question 5**

Do you agree with our proposal to introduce a new CP requiring issuers to maintain a board skills matrix and make disclosure set out in CP B.1.5?

Please give reasons for your views.

### Question 6(a)

In relation to our proposal to introduce a "hard cap" of six listed issuer directorships that INEDs may hold, do you agree with the hard cap to ensure that INEDs are able to devote sufficient time to carry out the work of the listed issuers?

No

Please provide reasons for your views.

The Nomination Committee will evaluate each INED's capabilities, including their time commitment, on a case-by-case basis before making an appointment. The rule regarding "six listed issuer directorships" can serve as a guideline for the NC's consideration, but it should not be a hard cap.

#### Question 6(b)

In relation to our proposal to introduce a "hard cap" of six listed issuer directorships that INEDs may hold, do you agree with the proposed three-year transition period to implement the hard cap?

Please provide reasons for your views.

#### **Question 7**

Do you agree with the proposal to introduce a new Mandatory
Disclosure Requirement (MDR) in the CG Code to require the nomination

committee to annually assess and disclose its assessment of each director's time commitment and contribution to the board?

Please provide reasons for your views.

### Question 8(a)

In relation to our proposal to introduce a "hard cap" of nine years on the tenure of INEDs, beyond which an INED will no longer be considered to be independent, do you agree with the proposed hard cap to strengthen board independence?

No

Please give reasons for your views.

We do not agree with the rationale that "where an INED who has served on a board for an extended period of time, the INED's continued independence will be increasingly at risk given their familiarity with the issuer's management". In contrast, their long-term knowledge of the company can provide valuable insights to the board especially in different economic cycles. They are more committed to the company long-term development.

## Question 8(b)

In relation to our proposal to introduce a "hard cap" of nine years on the tenure of INEDs, beyond which an INED will no longer be considered to be independent, do you agree that a person can be re-considered as an INED of the same issuer after a two-year cooling-off period?

Please provide reasons for your views.

## **Question 8(c)**

In relation to our proposal to introduce a "hard cap" of nine years on the tenure of INEDs, beyond which an INED will no longer be considered to be independent, do you agree with the proposed three-year transition period in respect of the implementation of the hard cap?

No

Please provide reasons for your views.

The proposed hard cap of nine years on the tenure of INEDs is a significant change. The stability of INEDs is critical in a listed company. An un-prepared and abrupt change to the long-established practice at the Board level might lead to adverse impact. Therefore, a three-year transition period is not sufficient.

#### **Question 9**

Do you agree with the proposal to require all issuers to disclose the length of tenure of each director in the CG Report?

Please provide reasons for your views.

### **Question 10**

Do you agree with our proposal to introduce a CP requiring issuers to have at least one director of a different gender on the nomination committee?

Please provide reasons for your views.

#### **Question 11**

Do you agree with our proposal to introduce a Listing Rule to require issuers to have and disclose a diversity policy for their workforce (including senior management)?

Please provide reasons for your views.

## **Question 12**

Do you agree with our proposal to upgrade from a CP to a MDR the requirement on the annual review of the implementation of an issuer's board diversity policy?

Please provide reasons for your views.

### **Question 13**

Do you agree with our proposal to require as a revised MDR separate disclosure of the gender ratio of: (i) senior management; and (ii) the workforce (excluding senior management) in the CG Report?

Please provide reasons for your views.

### **Question 14**

Do you agree with our proposal to codify the arrangements during temporary deviations from the requirement for issuers to have directors of different genders on the board as set out in draft Main Board Listing Rule 13.92(2) in Appendix I?

Please provide reasons for your views.

### Question 15(a)

Do you agree with our proposal to emphasise in Principle D.2 the board's responsibility for the issuer's risk management and internal controls and for the (at least) annual reviews of the effectiveness of the risk management and internal control systems?

Please provide reasons for your views.

#### Question 15(b)

Do you agree with our proposal to upgrade the requirement to conduct (at least) annual reviews of the effectiveness of the issuer's risk management and internal control systems to mandatory and require the disclosures set out in MDR paragraph H?

Please provide reasons for your views.

### **Question 16**

Do you agree with our proposal to refine the existing CPs in section D.2 of the CG Code setting out the scope of the (at least) annual reviews of the risk management and internal control systems?

Please provide reasons for your views.

## **Question 17**

Do you agree with our proposal to introduce a new MDR requiring specific disclosure of the issuer's policy on payment of dividends and the board's dividend decisions during the reporting period?

Please provide reasons for your views.

#### **Question 18**

Do you agree with our proposal to introduce a Listing Rule requirement for issuers to set a record date to determine the identity of security holders eligible to attend and vote at a general meeting or to receive entitlements?

Please provide reasons for your views.

### **Question 19**

Do you agree with our proposal to codify our recommended disclosures in respect of issuers' modified auditors' opinions into the Listing Rules?

Please provide reasons for your views.

### **Question 20**

Do you agree with our proposal to clarify our expectation of the provision of monthly updates in CP D.1.2 and the note thereto?

Please provide reasons for your views.

### **Question 21**

Do you agree with our proposal to align requirements for the nomination committee, the audit committee and the remuneration committee on establishing written terms of reference for the committee and the arrangements during temporary deviations from requirements as set out in draft Main Board Listing Rules 3.23, 3.27, 3.27B, 3.27C and 8A.28A in Appendix I?

Please provide reasons for your views.

## **Question 22**

Do you agree with the proposed implementation date of financial years commencing on or after 1 January 2025, with transitional arrangements as set out in paragraphs 182 to 183 of the Consultation Paper?

No

Please provide reasons for your views.

The proposed three-year transition period is insufficient for the implementation of such significant changes.