

### HKEx Clearing House Risk Management Reform Measures

8 July 2011 Press Conference

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#### Why Are the Clearing House Reforms Needed?



2008 global financial crisis and collapse of Lehman Brothers

Robustness of clearing houses crucial to stability and competitiveness of Hong Kong financial market


A global trend to review and tighten risk management standards

Enhancing IOSCO compliance and meeting evolving market conditions




### Conceptual Framework – Projected Loss Supported by Financial Resources













#### **Current Risk Management Issues – Funding**



HKSCC	ISSUES:   • Selective and static margining post-Lehman     • Insufficient and not scalable GF of \$245mn     RESULT:   Insufficient funding 70% of the time
НКСС	ISSUES:   • Give credit to collateral not yet received 1     • Use only 30% default assumption to calculate Dynamic RF     RESULT:   Undercharging CPs on Dynamic RF
SEOCH	ISSUES:   • No credit given to risk margin deposit already received <sup>2</sup> RESULT:   Overcharging CPs on Dynamic RF

1. HKCC currently counts collateral not yet received after an intraday margin call in daily RF calculation

2. SEOCH currently does not give credit to risk margin deposit and surplus funds in daily RF calculation



#### **Guiding Principles of the Proposal**



The reform is overdue and has to be done

It must be fair and equitable: CPs and HKEx both share the burden

"User pays": contributions should be commensurate with risks created

Minimise financial and administrative impact on segment creating smallest exposure



#### **Reference Made in Formulating Proposal**



LOCAL REGULATOR'S REQUIREMENT

**CPSS-IOSCO RECOMMENDATIONS** 

**BENCHMARKING WITH MAJOR GLOBAL CCPs** 



### Key Proposed Changes




Counterparty Default • Adopt largest + 5 <sup>th</sup> largest CPs & drop 30% for 3 clearing houses		RMC for 3 Clearing Houses	Risk Management Fund ("RMF")     Discuss with regulator and Gov't to establish RMF
Price Movement• HKSCC/SEOCH: 22%• HKCC HSI F/O: 20%*• HKCC HHI F/O: 20%• HKCC HHI F/O: 20%	<b>Projected</b> Loss	<section-header><section-header><section-header><section-header><text></text></section-header></section-header></section-header></section-header>	Risk Management Capital• Increase from \$3.1bn to \$4bnHKSCC• Introduce Dynamic GFHKCC• Exclude intraday margin call credit from RF calculationSEOCH• Give credit to risk margin deposit in RF calculationHKSCC• Adopt volatility-based margin methodology, min at 5%



#### **HKEx Funding Support – HKSCC Credits**






\*Based on backtesting proposed measures for three-year reference period of September 2007 through December 2010

~80% of the HKSCC CPs on average would not have been required to pay margin or Dynamic GF on a given day



#### **HKEx Funding Support – HKCC Contingent Advance**






HKCC Contingent Advance shares ~70% of CPs' incremental Dynamic RF requirement
Any loss sustained by HKCC Contingent Advance will be recoverable from CP 10

# Impact on HKSCC CPs – Margin and Dynamic GF (Backtesting Results)






Note: Statistics based on backtesting proposed measures for three-year reference period of Sep 2007 through Dec 2010

HKSCC Margin: 46% of time pay less; 31% of time pay up to \$4bn more HKSCC Dynamic GF: 77% of time pay up to \$1.4bn more



# Impact on Derivatives Market CPs – Dynamic RF (Backtesting Results)






Note: Statistics based on backtesting proposed measures for three-year reference period of Sep 2007 through Dec 2010

HKCC: 39% of time, no change or pay less; 61% of time, pay up to \$1bn more SEOCH: 87% of the time, pay less







**RMF** provides scalable funding resource and a buffer for future regulatory changes



#### **Next Step**



Public release 8 Jul 2011

Seminars and one-on-one meetings Jul – Oct 2011

Consultation period closing 28 Oct 2011

**Consultation conclusion target to release in early 2012** 





### **Thank You**